

Briefing

Peru

Fact-finding and advocacy visit report

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I. Executive summary

The 2006 election and return to power of Alan Garcia,¹ caused concern amongst human rights organisations within and outside of Peru, fearing that there would be negative consequences on the progress made under the previous administrations in the area of human rights and democratisation. Observers were particularly worried about the president's negative rhetoric regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission² (TRC) and the fight to bring to trial crimes involving human rights atrocities which had occurred during the period of internal conflict.

Unfortunately, now more than halfway through his presidential term, Garcia and others in his administration continue to consistently promote policies that validate these concerns, refusing to turn over to state prosecutors the names of military and police officers responsible for human rights atrocities; shelving the National Plan for Human Rights; and publicly accusing human rights defenders of terrorist sympathies. In 2009 the government also initially refused a donation offered by the German government to be designated for the creation and maintenance of a permanent museum remembering the victims of the twenty years of violence. A number of government officials, including the president, defended their decision by making public statements that such a museum would only glorify the terrorist groups. The government only changed its position in early April after a public backlash, led by Peruvian intellectuals, including Mario Vargas Llosa, victims' groups, and NGOs.

As was the case during a 2007 visit to the country, the primary concerns of the people and organisations with whom CSW met continue to be related to the government's antagonistic attitude toward anything related to the TRC, its report, and its recommendations. The TRC report presented conclusions on the two decades of violence and formulated a series of recommendations aimed at bringing about national reconciliation, ensuring that the cycle of violence would never be repeated. These recommendations included the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations, the official exhumation of mass graves and the identification of bodies, and reparations to the victims of the violence. Recommendations for institutional reforms to address many of the problems that had contributed both to the violence and the state's failures in responding to it were also made.

Unfortunately, more than five years on from the report's publication, its recommendations are far from being implemented in their entirety. There continues to be significant resistance from influential politicians, political parties and other powerful bodies, including elements in the military, who are implicated in the findings of the TRC. The current administration, under President Garcia, contains a number of individuals implicated in the abuses committed in the 1980s and 1990s, not least, Garcia himself.³ Prosecutors attempting to investigate human rights atrocities committed by the military or police officials constantly find their investigations blocked at every turn. Ántero Flores Aráoz Esparza, the Minister of Defense, has been particularly hostile and has blocked the prosecution of human right cases by simply refusing to turn over any records which would identify military personnel responsible for

¹ Garcia is a member of the APRA party, which is part of the International Socialist Party – but has distanced himself from self-styled socialist Hugo Chavez and other more radical leaders in Latin America.

² In August 2003, the Peruvian TRC submitted its final report. According to their findings, up to 70,000 people had been killed or forcibly disappeared between 1980 and 2000 at the hands of leftist guerrilla groups, The Shining Path and the MRTA (the Revolutionary Movement of Tupac Amaru), and of government forces. The TRC found that the terrorist groups were responsible for the majority of these crimes. The report also concluded that traditionally marginalised communities, including the largely indigenous Quechua speaking communities of the Andean regions had borne the brunt of the violence.

³ The final report of the TRC concluded that while Garcia may not have been directly responsible, in a criminal sense, for human rights violations committed under his administration, he was politically responsible.

crimes against humanity. Lastly, the government also regularly and publicly disparaged the TRC report as having a pro-terrorist bias and has repeatedly accused those working for the implementation of its recommendations of being Shining Path sympathisers, or worse, actual terrorists, with the aim of destabilising the country.

In July 2005, the Peruvian Congress voted in favour of one aspect of the recommendations, which deals with government reparations to the victims of the violence and would allow for the creation of a national registry of victims. While this was a significant step forward, almost four years later many victims have yet to see any sign of the reparations themselves. The implementation of the National Plan for Reparations has been far from consistent across the country, and some regional governments have failed entirely to implement the plan. In addition, the government has refused to provide any resources for the creation of the Single Registry of Victims, upon which the individual reparations programme is dependent, essentially making the programme non-functional. NGOs and some local government officials are using their own resources to try to build the registry but the task, without any support from the government, is monumental and progress is extremely slow.

One highly significant development in Peru is the trial of former president Alberto Fujimori, which was entering its final stages at the time of CSW's visit. While most observers believed that the trial had been balanced and fair and were confident of a guilty verdict, concern was expressed at the polarising effect the trial was having on Peruvian society, with the population divided on the question of Fujimori's guilt and what, if any, prison sentence he should be given. The Garcia government has appeared to be highly ambivalent on the issue, perhaps because President Garcia was also head of state during a period when human rights atrocities were committed on a massive scale, and it is feared that a guilty verdict and significant prison sentence could set a worrying (for Garcia) precedent. There are also concerns that a guilty verdict may be overturned or a lengthy prison sentence reduced by the Peruvian Supreme Court, but it is also clear that the government is very sensitive to the possibility of an international backlash should this take place.

Democratic institutions are fragile and Garcia's administration has, thus far, shown no propensity to strengthening them. Instead they have attempted to attack civil society through legislation and continue to employ much of the polarising rhetoric and some of the abusive strategies of the not so distant past. However, Garcia is keen to pursue close relations with the European Union and the United States, particularly as regards trade agreements, and is attempting to position Peru to represent the more moderate, progressive, and investment-friendly face of Latin America. This presents a valuable opportunity, therefore, for the EU and other members of the international community, to use their influence to push Garcia and the Peruvian Congress to move the country forward by implementing the TRC recommendations and the National Plan for Human Rights. In addition there is an opportunity to encourage the reforms necessary to make state institutions more transparent and accountable while at the same time encouraging a responsible and active civil society.

2. Recommendations

2.1. To the Peruvian Government

2.1.1. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Recommendations

- To implement the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Recommendations into law in their entirety;
- To express public support for the conclusions and recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, recognising that the TRC was a government appointed body, whose members included representatives from the military, the Catholic and Protestant churches, and former members of the government;
- To provide sufficient resources for the creation of the Single Registry of Victims and to provide support to organisations and local government carrying out this work. To ensure that victims are aware of their rights and to facilitate, as much as possible, the process of registering;
- To provide appropriate reparations to victims of human rights abuses and to insist that regional governments responsible for the allocation of these reparations fulfil their obligation to formulate and implement regional plans for reparations, providing logistical and expert support where needed;
- To ensure that those bodies responsible for providing services granted as part of reparations, including public hospitals and universities, are aware of their responsibilities to victims of the political violence and to insist that they fulfil these responsibilities.

2.1.2. Human Rights Institutions

- To promote and fully implement the National Plan for Human Rights;
- To reinstate the National Human Rights Coordinator (CNDH), the Bishops Commission for Social Action (CEAS) and the Peruvian Council of Evangelical Churches (CONEP) as official observers on the National Council for Human Rights.

2.1.3. Investigations

- To allocate sufficient resources to government bodies responsible for the investigation (including exhumations and DNA analyses) and judicialisation of cases of human rights atrocities;
- To insist that government bodies, including the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, cooperate with investigations into human rights atrocities and that they provide materials and testimony critical to these investigations to prosecutors' offices;
- To allow the Ombudsman's offices to carry out their work, free from government interference, and to support their offices in the compilation of an Official Register of the Disappeared;

- To guarantee the safety of human rights defenders and others involved in cases involving human rights violations, including prosecutors, witnesses, judges, forensic scientists and lawyers;
- To abide by all clauses in the San Jose Pact, to fully participate in any cases that reach the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and to comply with the Court's decisions, particularly those where agents acting on behalf of the state are found to be liable.

2.1.4. Wrongful Imprisonment and Prison Conditions

- That the government should include in its annual budget sufficient resources for prison authorities (INPE) to maintain and implement regimes that meet the basic international human rights standards as specified in the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.

2.2. To the European Union

While important, putting pressure on President Garcia alone is not sufficient. The EU must work with all elements of Peruvian society, political, military and civil, to encourage reform, respect for international standards of human rights, and social reconciliation.

What happens in Peru will have a direct impact on the surrounding region. If the international community does not take action to support the promotion and maturation of democratic processes, the eradication of corruption and unambiguous steps toward national reconciliation, Peru will be in danger of spiralling back into the same pattern of injustice and inequality that has characterised most of its past. This can only lead to increased instability in the region, which will have implications for Latin America and the rest of the world, particularly in respect to the illegal drug trade, arms trafficking and terrorist activities

Therefore CSW makes the following recommendations to the EU:

- To encourage the Peruvian government to comply with all of the recommendations above;
- To make the implementation of the TRC recommendations and the National Plan for Human Rights a priority in relations with Peru, both in the context of political dialogue, economic agreements and aid programmes;
- To actively seek ways to engage with and strengthen civil society, for example, by continuing to expand funding for projects aimed at the promotion of democracy and human rights, and to discourage the Peruvian government from enacting legislation that contributes to the weakening of civil society;
- To consistently fulfil its commitments under the EU human rights guidelines by making its position on these issues clear, through diplomatic channels to the Peruvian government, and through public channels to Peruvian society, and to demonstrate its support for human rights defenders and its firm stance against the death penalty;
- Maintain and increase funding, where possible, for institutions like the Ombudsman's and Attorney General's offices; at the same time push the Peruvian government to demonstrate its support for this work by committing a significant amount of resources to these institutions and their work.

2.3. To International Investors and Donors

An honest and transparent judiciary and an end to the culture of impunity, social cohesion and stability will, in conjunction with its rich natural resources, make Peru a far more attractive investment location than if the cycle of corruption and violence continues. Therefore, CSW recommends that donors and international investors, including business and corporate entities, take a leading role in encouraging the Peruvian government to pursue institutional reforms and other recommendations put forth by the TRC and in the National Plan for Human Rights.

CSW also recommends that international investors and donors

- Explore innovative ways to support initiatives aimed at promoting national reconciliation at both the national and region level, for example, by offering economic or other material resources (e.g. computers) in support of reparations programmes;
- Establish partnerships with respected local humanitarian, development and human rights NGOs and/or regional governments that are pursuing positive social and economic development strategies in order to develop programmes that will meet local needs and strengthen civil society;
- Seek ways to uphold and encourage respect for human rights in Peru, particularly by reinvesting profits back into the communities in which businesses are based, to encourage education, development and peaceful resolution to conflict;
- Ensure that that all humanitarian and development aid is used in the nominated manner and reaches those for whom it is designated.

3. Themes of concern

3.1. Judicialisation

The vast majority of Peruvian victims of human rights violations continue to await justice. While there have been a few advances, the judicialisation of cases involving violations of human rights continues to be hampered for a number of reasons, most importantly continued government hostility and interference in cases involving members of the military and/or government. Fifty percent of cases have languished in the “investigative stage” for years and have made no progress through the courts. State officials responsible for investigating and prosecuting cases of human rights violations have also been subject to threats, intimidation and defamation campaigns in the media.

The NGOs and victims’ associations which carry out the primary investigations necessary to initiate judicial action work with minimal resources and often under threat from those responsible for the violations. State bodies responsible for investigations and prosecutions are chronically under-funded and their investigations often hit a brick wall because of a refusal of other government offices to cooperate by turning over relevant documents and information. Those involved with legal cases that do go forward, particularly those in which the state or individuals acting on behalf of the state are the accused, often are the targets of coordinated campaigns including personal defamation and harassment.

The case of Putis, in a remote part of the Peruvian highlands, is one example of the difficulty of bringing these cases to court and seeking justice for the victims and their families. In mid 2008, a mass grave, dating from 1984 was finally exhumed with support from the Peruvian Association of Forensic Anthropologists (EPAF), Peace and Hope – a Peruvian Protestant human rights organisation, and local public prosecutor, Dr. Cristina Olazábal. This

exhumation was carried out without support from the central government as repeated requests to the government for permission and resources to exhume the remains of the 123 men, women and children in the grave had gone unanswered.

There is no doubt that military officials were responsible for this brutal massacre of civilians, however, the Ministry of Defense has stonewalled any attempts to obtain records on officers stationed in Putis at the time. Dr. Olazábal and Peace and Hope have had to carry out their own investigations and have managed to identify the commanding officers but not those who actually carried out the massacre. They have successfully introduced the case into the Lima courts, where it is still in the very initial stages. However, the people of Putis, like many of the other thousands of victims in Peru, have waited 25 years for justice and are not confident that it will arrive in their lifetime. The attitude and behaviour of the Peruvian government has contributed in great part to the lack of confidence in the judicial process.

Another very concerning aspect of the process is the total lack of any legal support offered by the government to the victims of human rights atrocities. This is in contrast to members of the military and police forces accused of committing the atrocities who are automatically offered different levels of legal representation, including the right to a public defender and/or special lawyers provided by the Police and Armed Forces legal services. In addition, the government has designated a budget of three million soles (just under one million US dollars) to offer particular support to high ranking officers accused of crimes committed “in the exercise of their duties”.

This stands in direct contrast to the complete lack of material support offered to the victims. CSW was told of a number of cases which have been archived or thrown out due to lack of evidence because the victims, called to testify as key witnesses, could not afford the costs associated with travelling to, and staying in, Lima where the majority of these cases are being tried. Despite the fact that this witness testimony is critical to the prosecution, these costs are not provided by the state. Staff at Peace and Hope are already looking for ways to fund the travel and accommodations for members of the Putis community whose testimony will be vital if there is to be any hope of a conviction.

Dr. Olazábal, who is based in Ayacucho, a ten hour journey by bus from Lima, highlighted the fact that law now mandates that any case in which multiple perpetrators are implicated in human rights atrocities must be transferred to Lima. Again, no resources are provided to victims and/or their families to travel and stay in the capital even if their testimony is crucial to the case. Dr. Olazábal, who has received threats for her work on human rights cases, also expressed concern that in many cases the state neglects to provide sufficient translation support despite the fact that many, if not the majority of these cases involve victims whose first and often only language is Quechua or Aymara. Both Dr. Olazábal and CSW partner organisations pointed out that forcing already traumatised victims to leave their regions and travel to Lima, often disorientates and further intimidates victims.

3.1.1. Reparations

One of the key provisions in the TRC Recommendations was for reparations to be made to the victims of the violence. According to the TRC the burden for making these reparations fell on the State, firstly because of the negligence it displayed in its slow response to the violence and its failure to protect the population in marginalised regions of Peru, and secondly because of its direct responsibility for a significant percentage of the human rights crimes that occurred. The TRC recommended that the reparations be made both at the individual and at the community levels; in other words, to the victims themselves and also to the communities particularly hard hit by the violence. These reparations were to be both

practical, for example in the form of financial payouts, preference for university seats⁴ or health care coverage; and symbolic, for example through monuments, museums and ceremonies honouring those who died.

While the government has designated money for reparations, it was clear through the course of the visit that the allocation has been haphazard and many victims – both individuals and communities – have seen no sign of them, or worse, have been granted reparations but then denied the right to receive them. According to those CSW met, at the current rate it will take twenty to thirty years for all of the reparations to be distributed and implemented. As many of the victims are already elderly, and since twenty years have already passed in the case of some violations, it is likely that a significant percentage of victims will never benefit from these programmes.

Representatives of victims' associations in different parts of the country report that many victims find it impossible to access reparations that are legally their due. In some cases, this is apparently because the individuals and entities that should supply the services or implement the reparations are not aware of their responsibilities and/or do not understand the procedures. Victims' groups continue to report that in Lima many hospital officials or medical personnel do not understand or are unaware that they must provide medical services to victims who have been given health care coverage as part of their reparations. In addition many do not recognise legal documents that should guarantee the victims' rights to support. However, according to CSW's partners, in other cases, personnel were fully aware of their obligations yet simply refused to comply with them. All of this, of course, leads to feelings of extreme frustration and anger as many perceive these problems as indicative of the State's indifference towards them and their plight, despite promises to the contrary.

There also appear to be major bureaucratic issues – particularly in relation to the interplay between the central and regional governments. While the central government in Lima has determined the amount of reparations due to each of the regions in Peru, the allocation of the reparations is dependant on regional governments presenting a plan for their implementation. A number of regions, including those most affected by the violence, have failed to do this. Some have been told that the failure of the regional governments to submit plans for implementation is due to a lack of resources within their administrations, and that they do not have the personnel to do the practical work of drawing up these plans. However, it appears that this inability to devote resources or personnel to reparations plans is mostly because reparations do not rate very high on the local governments' priorities. Indeed in some cases, there appears to be a lack of clarity about what collective reparations should look like, with some local governments attempting to use these funds for economic development projects.

3.1.2. The Single Registry of Victims

As was pointed out again and again over the course of CSW's visit, the creation of one official registry of victims is crucial in order to determine who is eligible to receive reparations. It is important to note that the government has stated that no individual victim can receive reparations until the entire registry is finished.⁵ With upwards of 70,000 victims, many of whom are non-Spanish speaking and/or live in extremely remote regions of the country, the scope of the project is overwhelming. The nature of the work, which necessitates awareness raising, extensive travel, multilingual staff and laborious investigations makes the process painstakingly slow. When one takes into account that the central

⁴ Since our last visit, legislation has been passed making the children of victims ineligible for any reparations related to education. This is problematic as it is impractical for a number of reasons for many victims to pursue their studies, but they would like their children to have access to this form of reparation.

⁵ The only exceptions to this are the individual reparations associated with the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta cases and which were a result of an Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruling

government provides absolutely no resources for this project, it is surprising that it has advanced at all.

Many victims are unaware that they need to register and/or do not know how to go about doing so. There has been no effort by the government to inform citizens of their right to register if they suffered a human rights violation during the violent period. Some of those who have attempted to register themselves at the government's official registry offices in Lima reported that officials working in those offices kept them waiting for long periods of time, complained that they brought their children with them, and used racist and abusive language. In cases of rape and torture, victims who could not produce visible scarring on their bodies or a medical certificate from the time of the alleged violation to back up their claim were told they would not be able to register. No flexibility has been shown for victims too traumatised by their ordeal or too fearful to seek medical treatment, nor for those who simply had no access to medical support, a common reality in much of the Andean highlands where the majority of these violations took place.

Peace and Hope and CEAS have committed a significant portion of their resources to facilitate the registration of cases for the Single Registry of Victims. In some parts of the country, local governments are also engaged in this work; however they too lack the resources needed to carry out this work. According to the Ayacucho regional government, there are only two stations in the entire region, which was the epicentre of the violence and which encompasses almost 45,000 square kilometres, carrying out the work of registering victims. One of these, based in Huanta, is a tiny office working with an extremely limited operating budget, with around four full time staff and two or three computers, and is tasked with the job of registering approximately 20,000 victims. The dedication of these workers is impressive; the central government's total neglect of this project is inexcusable.

3.1.3. Human Rights Defenders, other Activists, and NGOs

Human rights defenders, whether individuals or organisations, continue to receive threats on a regular basis. Those involved in the investigation of cases of human rights violations in order to bring those responsible to trial have been particular targets. Many have also been the victims of defamation campaigns in the media or orchestrated high tech attacks such as hijacking their websites or setting up impostor sites, hijacking e-mail accounts to send out false and defamatory messages, and sending threats to personal mobile telephone number or e-mail addresses. CSW partner organisations, Peace and Hope and CEAS, have received threats directed both at individual staff members and at the organisations as a whole, and have been the victims of attacks on their IT systems. Environmental activists, forensic scientists, and local and regional prosecutors have also been the recipients of threats and defamation campaigns in the media. Private security firms, some linked to the Peruvian military, have been implicated in some of these. The NGO community is also concerned about threats coming from the government itself alongside what appears to be the criminalisation of social protest.

Finally, Supreme Decree 008-2008 issued in April 2008 which expelled CONEP, CEAS and the CNDH from the National Human Rights Council where they had held observer status gives great cause for concern. CONEP officials stated that they believed this to be in retaliation for their repeated questions regarding the government's failure to implement the National Plan for Human Rights, developed under the presidency of Alejandro Toledo. Whatever the reasoning, the elimination of one of the last remaining spaces for dialogue between government officials and representatives of civil society on human rights issues is a major step backward.

4. Background - Summary of CSW involvement

CSW has been involved in promoting human rights in Peru since the Church in the Andean highlands first came under attack from both guerrilla and government forces in the early 1980s. By the 1990s CSW had developed a specific focus on the wrongful imprisonment of innocent men and women charged with participating in terrorist activities under draconian legislation put in place by former president Alberto Fujimori, now on trial himself, for human rights violations. Our work has been carried out through partnerships with Peruvian Protestant and Roman Catholic human rights organizations, Peace and Hope (*Paz y Esperanza*) and CEAS respectively. Both of these NGOs provide legal aid to victims of wrongful imprisonment.

Protestant and Roman Catholic Christians were by no means the only victims of the different armed actors and CSW in no way wishes to minimize the atrocities carried out against any of the other groups in Peru. It is important to recognise, however, that the Shining Path did incorporate targeted religious persecution into its overall campaign to win the countryside and unfortunately the government forces also targeted Christian leaders and laypeople because of actions that were rooted in their faith.

CSW's work with Peace and Hope and CEAS has continued to evolve, particularly in relation to events over the past decade, including massive corruption scandals, subsequent investigations and trials, the restoration of democracy after Fujimori fled the country, and the creation of the TRC to investigate the atrocities carried out by all actors during the 1980s and 1990s. Largely as a result of the creation of the TRC, a number of specific unresolved crimes and atrocities, including massacres and forced disappearances, committed against Christians and Christian communities in the 1980s and the early 1990s have resurfaced. Our partners have been intimately involved in the work associated with these cases and CSW continues to seek methods of supporting them.

The suffering of the Church should not be seen in isolation but as part of the much wider context of the suffering of a nation, in which there were approximately 2.5 million victims.⁶ CSW's Roman Catholic and Protestant partners recognise that true national reconciliation as proposed by the TRC will also aid in healing and reconciliation within the Church and consequently are actively campaigning for the full implementation of the TRC's recommendations. In order to support them, CSW is involved in campaigning alongside partners in Peru and in Europe for the implementation of the recommendations of the TRC, which were presented along with the final report in August 2003.

Peace and Hope continues to serve victims and their families. The organisation provides psychological and spiritual support, as well as economic and material support when possible. They also provide legal aid, for example to attempt to discover the fate of disappeared loved ones through legal channels and eventually to identify those responsible so that criminal charges can be filed. The work, which is difficult enough because of a lack of resources, little official support (and in many cases active official hostility) can be particularly burdensome because of the gruesome nature of most of the crimes and the emotional needs of the victims' families, putting huge psychological pressure on those working on these cases. The investigators and human rights workers themselves have little regular access to good quality psychological support or security protection for them and their families.

CSW has visited Peru seven times since 2000 in order to spend time with our Peruvian partners to gain a deeper understanding of the situation, build our relationships with them, and to demonstrate our moral and spiritual commitment to the work they are carrying out.

⁶ This number is used by the TRC to include not only the direct victims themselves but also those who suffered as a result of the crimes committed against the victims, for example, spouses and children of the forcibly disappeared and of the wrongly imprisoned.

It is also a valuable opportunity to assess the current political and social trends which often have a direct impact on the success or failure of the work we support.

5. Purpose of visit

This was CSW's seventh visit to Peru since 2000. This visit had the following objectives:

- a) To meet with CSW funded partners CEAS and Peace and Hope to assess their workload and current needs and to demonstrate our continuing solidarity with them and their work;
- b) To attend and observe the trial of former president Alberto Fujimori;
- c) To meet with key policy makers and officials, as well as representatives of civil society to monitor and assess progress on the implementation of the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission two years after the presentation of its final report;
- d) To increase our understanding of the current environment in which our partners are working;
- e) To visit the community of Putis to encourage them, express solidarity and assess their conditions;
- f) To evaluate the current political situation and its implications for the aforementioned issues.

6. Meetings

- The office of Ing. Juana A. Huancahuari Paucar, Member of Peruvian Congress for Ayacucho and head of the Congressional Human Rights Committee
- National Ombudsman's Office – Dr. Gisella Vignolo Huamani; Adjunct Ombudsman for Human Rights and the Disabled
- Peruvian Council of Evangelicals (CONEP)
- Peace and Hope Office – Lima
- CEAS – Lima
- Peace and Hope and CEAS joint project registering victims for the Single Registry of Victims - Huachipa
- The National Coordinator for Human Rights
- The Association of Displaced Families in Lima (ASFADDEL)
- Santa Monica Prison
- Peace and Hope Office – Ayacucho
- Regional Ombudsman for Ayacucho
- Ayacucho Regional Government
- Edwin Bustios Saavedra, Mayor of Huanta
- Single Registry of Victims registration office - Huanta
- Putis Association of Victims
- Julio Cusihuaman and family (former innocent prisoner)
- Visit to Los Cabitos, Ayacucho with APRODEH
- Dr. Cristina Olazabal, public prosecutor for Ayacucho

7. Participants

Anna-Lee Stangl	CSW Research and Advocacy Officer, Latin America
Marie-Laure Verdier	PhD Student

8. Itinerary

9-14 February	Lima
14-15 February	Ayacucho
16 February	Ayacucho and Huanta
17 February	Putis
18 February	Ayacucho
19-23 February	Lima